IndyCar Glory Days - Part I

That the business of IndyCar racing is struggling is not in dispute. Unfortunately, discussion of how the IRL might become competitive in the marketplace typically devolves to the level of mere disagreement, with personal preferences (ovals v road courses, tech v spec) dominating the discourse.

IndyCar must formulate and execute a practical, profitable business strategy. Paramount to the task is identifying where and when Indy racing took a wrong turn, as well as how NASCAR (sans-culottes!) had positioned itself to take advantage. This requires dispassionate analysis of the type we endeavor to present at The Indy Idea.

Roggespierre recalls listening to an Indianapolis radio show, co-hosted by Robin Miller, one night in the early 1990s. A local boxing promoter proudly informed Miller that the highest-rated IndyCar race in ESPN history had failed to match the audience of the lowest-rated installment of Friday Night Fights. Roggespierre was further surprised that Miller not only accepted the boxing man's facts, but also confirmed them.

IndyCar races in those days typically earned ratings in the mid-2s. As appealing as that might seem today, it was not and is not extraordinarily impressive given NASCAR's typical weekly television audience of between 6 and 8 million viewers.

The CART IndyCar Series of the early 1990s was by all appearances a profitable business that boasted an impressive roster of corporate sponsors. And yet, aside from the Indianapolis 500, IndyCar was not highly valued by television broadcasters. Why? Had consumer demand not warranted what appeared to be a significant level of investment by all of those sponsors?

In a word, no.

to be continued...

Roggespierre