Thursday, August 27, 2009

IndyCar: Versus by the Numbers



We like numbers at The Indy Idea. Numbers provide tangible data points from which we can derive a reasonably accurate assessment of IndyCar's positioning and performance in the competitive marketplace.

The size of the average IndyCar television audience is particularly instructive. Television ratings in many ways constitute a perfectly competitive market. After cable and satellite fees have been paid, the only remaining costs are opportunity costs. Watching one live program necessarily means not watching another. At any particular point in time, the only additional option is to not watch any live television program at all.

Connections, personal sales, and inflated capitalization ratios can not buy good television ratings. TV numbers can't be skewed by complimentary race tickets and compulsory participation in corporate sales outings. TV viewership therefore gives us a reasonable approximation of citizens' relative preferences based on their behavior in the marketplace. The egalitarian foundation of TV ratings strips away noise and lays bare the truths of market acceptance and rejection.


Publicly available data regarding IndyCar ratings on Versus are a mixed bag. Yes, the overall numbers are bad, but such an assessment hardly qualifies as serious analysis. More to the point, mere observation is not a useful management tool. It is clear that IRL management must devise a strategy to increase the competitiveness of IndyCar racing in the television viewership marketplace.

This is a fundamental metric in the sports entertainment sector. That IRL managers are not held accountable for achieving competitive TV ratings is beyond comprehension.

IRL management must identify sources of competitive advantage that enable some broadcast properties to thrive on Versus. What are the key variables that separate the winners and losers? If IRL managers were to seriously engage in product development - a leap, we admit, given their history of refusing to manage the product - then how might they manipulate and manage those key variables? Which metrics should be used to determine success and failure?

Roggespierre, with aid from Danton and Marat, shall examine the available numbers and explore the questions above in the coming days. We encourage those who work at 4565 West 16th Street to join us. If the knitters conclude that TV ratings do in fact fall under IRL management purview, then it could be the Montagnards here that save your heads!

Roggespierre

2 comments:

  1. "It is clear that IRL management must devise a strategy to increase the competitiveness of IndyCar racing in the television viewership marketplace."

    It's clear to you and I perhaps, but I haven't seen any signs that they (IRL management) have even a remote grasp of the concept. There are quite a few 'old money' companies out there, or now out-of-business, that follow or followed the outmoded concept of "if we build a better mousetrap the world will beat a path to our door," it won't. In today's marketplace you need to create the 'path' and light it up so the world can't miss it.

    I'm afraid IMS is stuck in the 50's as to the way they perceive the market and their place in it.

    -John

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  2. John,
    Thanks for your comments. Of course you're right, and that's why we're here. We say we're writing "as if" what we have to say might in fact lead to substantive change.

    We know that there WILL be significant change at the IMS and IRL. The question is whether that change will be voluntary or involuntary. The latter case would have the Hulman George family effectively forced to take actions that it might not want to take.

    We have not yet reached that point, but it's coming into view. Our hope here is that corrective action might be taken before we get there.

    Best,
    Roggespierre

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